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Abstract
A wide range of empirical biases hampers hedge fund databases. In this pa-
per we focus upon survival-related biases and disentangle look-ahead biases
due to self-selection of funds and due to fund termination. Self-selection
arises because funds voluntarily report their information to data vendors
and may decide to stop doing so. By extending existing methodology, we
analyze persistence in hedge fund performance over the period 1994-2000,
taking into account the above biases. The results show that look-ahead bi-
ases due to liquidation and self-selection enforce each other and may lead
to overestimating expected returns by as much as 8% per year. Overall,
the results are consistent with positive persistence in hedge fund returns at
horizons of two and four quarters.
JEL-codes: G11, G23, G14
1 Introduction
During the last decade, the hedge fund industry has grown enormously.
Hedge funds di¤er from mutual funds and other investment vehicles by their
lack of regulation1, with limited transparency and disclosure, and by their
internal structure (see, e.g., Fung and Hsieh, 1997). For example, most
hedge funds try to achieve an absolute return target, irrespective of global
market movements, while hedge fund managers typically have incentive-
based contracts. Accordingly, hedge funds have a broad exibility in the
type of securities they hold and the type of positions they take. On the other
hand, investors in hedge funds are often confronted with lockup periods and
redemption notice periods. Such restrictions on withdrawals imply smaller
cash uctuations, and give fund managers more freedom in setting up long-
term or illiquid positions.
Their non-standard features make hedge funds an interesting investment
vehicle for investors with potential diversication benets. A wide range
of academic papers examines hedge fund performance and its persistence
(see, e.g., Brown, Goetzmann and Ibbotson, 1999, Agarwal and Naik, 2000,
Boyson, 2003, Capocci and Hübner, 2004, Baquero, Ter Horst and Verbeek,
2004). Both for the mutual fund industry (Sirri and Tufano, 1998) and
the hedge fund industry (Agarwal, Daniel and Naik, 2003), it is reported
that money ows chase past performance. Berk and Green (2004) present a
theoretical model that explains that persistence can be competed away by
investors rationally shifting their money in search for superior investments.
In the hedge fund industry, however, the presence of liquidity restrictions
that prevent investors to quickly shift their money from one fund to the
other, may result in genuine (short-run) persistence even if investors allocate
their money according to past performance (see Baquero, Ter Horst and
Verbeek, 2004).
In this paper we analyze the persistence in hedge fund performance tak-
ing into account a number of potentially important biases that are present in
hedge funds databases (see Fung and Hsieh, 1997, or Ackermann, McEnally
and Ravenscraft, 1999) or are induced by the employed methodology. One
of these biases is self-selection bias that arises due to the fact that hedge
1U.S. hedge funds are dened by their freedom from regularity controls of the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940.
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funds voluntarily report to a data vendor. Since hedge funds are not allowed
to advertise publicly, these data vendors serve as an important distribution
channel. Self-selection bias exists either because underperformers do not
wish to make their performance known, because funds that performed well
have less incentive to report to data vendors to attract potential investors,
or because funds do not wish intervention in case SEC interprets reporting
as illegal advertising.
In addition to self-selection bias another better-known bias, survivorship
bias, also signicantly a¤ects standard measures of performance persistence
of hedge funds (see, e.g. Brown, Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1999)). This
bias is more severe than in the mutual fund industry due to the much higher
attrition rate (about 14% per year for hedge funds versus about 5% per year
for mutual funds). Attrition of hedge funds is due to a number of reasons,
such as liquidation, closed to new investments or because the manager vol-
untarily decides to stop reporting. This in contrast to mutual funds where
attrition is usually related to fund termination (liquidation or merger with
other funds). Ackermann, McEnally and Ravenscraft (1999) argue that the
previously mentioned self-selection bias and the survivorship bias o¤set each
other. While it may be the case that, e.g., average fund returns are more
or less una¤ected by the joint operation of endogenous self-selection and
liquidation, it is not possible, in general, that these two processes leave the
cross-sectional and time-series distributions of returns una¤ected. A nal
issue is backlling bias, which arises because hedge funds are typically added
to a database with an instant history.
While most studies attempt to correct for survivorship bias by taking
fund returns into account until the moment of disappearance, a second
ex-post conditioning bias, the so-called look-ahead bias, is usually not ac-
counted for (see, e.g. Carhart, 1997, and Ter Horst, Nijman and Verbeek,
2001). Look-ahead bias (or multi-period sampling bias) arises because per-
sistence studies require returns to be observed during a number of consec-
utive periods. A recent study of persistence in performance of hedge funds
of Baquero, Ter Horst, and Verbeek (2004) nds that look-ahead bias seri-
ously a¤ects the results and that correcting for look-ahead bias is essential.
For instance, without correcting for look-ahead bias due to fund liquidation,
average raw returns (within a given ranking decile) might be overestimated
by as much as 5% when persistence is analyzed at an annual level. However,
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in Baquero, Ter Horst and Verbeek (2004) it is assumed that self-selection
is exogenous. If self-selection would be mainly driven by good performing
funds that are closed to new investment, this may have a compensating im-
pact upon performance and persistence measures, such that liquidation bias
and self-selection bias o¤set each other. On the other hand, if self-selection
is negatively related to past performance, correcting for self-selection bias
may exacerbate the liquidation bias corrections and thus strengthen the re-
ported persistence patterns in hedge fund performance. Consequently, it is
an interesting question to separately identify the impact of liquidation bias
and self-selection bias in hedge fund persistence.
In this paper we analyze the persistence in hedge fund performance
taking into account both liquidation and self-selection bias. The question
whether past performance is indicative of future performance has been ex-
tensively studied for mutual funds. The results are somewhat mixed, but in
general it can be concluded that there is little evidence of performance per-
sistence of mutual funds (see, e.g., Carhart, 1997, Ter Horst and Verbeek,
2000, Wermers, 2003, Bollen and Busse, 2004). For hedge funds recent
studies show some evidence of short term performance persistence (see, e.g.
Agarwal and Naik, 2000, Bares, Gibson and Gyger, 2002) while at longer
horizons the results are more ambiguous (see, e.g., Brown, Goetzmann and
Ibbotson, 1999, Brown and Goetzmann, 2003). None of these studies cor-
rects for the possibility of look-ahead bias. Baquero, Ter Horst and Verbeek
(2004) correct for look-ahead bias due to fund liquidation and nd exacer-
bated persistence patterns in hedge fund performance, particularly at the
annual horizon.
In this paper we make a number of contributions to the hedge funds lit-
erature. First, we empirically examine the factors that a¤ect self-selection
bias by identifying variables from reports supplied by data vendors. Inter-
estingly, past performance appears to have a signicant and negative impact
upon the probability that a fund decides to stop reporting. That is, poorly
performing funds are more likely to disappear from the TASS database at
their own request. Second, we propose a method that will correct for self-
selection bias separately from the look-ahead bias due to fund liquidation.
Finally, while disentangling the e¤ects of liquidation bias and self-selection
bias, we analyze the persistence in hedge fund performance over various
horizons, using the TASS database of hedge funds over the period 1994-
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2000. The results indicate that, in addition to liquidation bias, correcting
for self-selection bias is important. Both biases work in the same direction
and their combined impact may result in overestimating expected returns
within a given decile by as much as 7:6% per year.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the
TASS database, analyze fund attrition and relate it to liquidation and self-
selection. Moreover, we estimate probit specications for both the liquida-
tion and the self-selection decisions. Section 3 explains how one can correct
for look-ahead bias due to liquidation and self-selection when analyzing per-
sistence in hedge fund performance and how these two biases can be disen-
tangled. Empirical results concerning persistence at di¤erent horizons are
presented in Section 4, while Section 5 concludes.
2 Liquidation and Self-selection
The data used in this paper are from TASS Management Limited and con-
tain information of 1797 hedge funds over the period 1994-2000, where we
restrict attention to funds reporting in US$. Although the TASS database
contains information of hedge funds since 1979, we focus on the period 1994-
2000 for several reasons. First, information on deadfunds is available only
for funds that disappeared since 1994, and second, the number of funds be-
fore 1994 is very small. As mentioned above, whether or not we observe
returns for a given fund depends upon two main issues. First, the fund may
be liquidated. Second, if the fund is not liquidated, its management may
prefer to not report returns and other information to TASS. We refer to this
second decision as self-selection. Another potential problem is backlling
bias or instant history bias, which arises because when funds are included
in the TASS database for the rst time, they come with a history of several
quarters. We take backlling bias into account by only using information
on a fund once its age exceeds one year.
In the TASS database, some information on the reason why a fund dis-
appeared form the sample is provided. For example, we nd explanations
like This fund liquidated end of August 1996., Due to the Fund Man-
agers request this fund has been taken o¤ the database., or This fund is
closed for new investments.. In order to disentangle the di¤erent selection
processes, we construct a variable that contains a code for the disappearance
4
year preceding disappearance
disappearance number of average average
reason funds return net money ow
1: liquidated or closed down 316  1:7%  3:7%
2: at fund managers request 177 0:2% 9:4%
3: closed to new investors 32 0:7% 15:8%
4: closed (unknown) 77  0:9% 0:6%
5: matured 10  0:1%  4:8%
Table 1: Reasons of Disappearance. For each disappearance code, the table
lists the number of funds that during 1994-2000 dropped from the TASS
database due to this reason, the average quarterly return and net money
ows over the preceding four quarters.
reason. We used the following codes and scanned the reported disappearance
record for the following expressions: 1. liquidated or closed down, 2. at fund
managers request, 3. closed to new investors, 4. closed (unknown), and 5.
matured. We consider reasons 2, 3 and 5 as self-selection, while reason 1 is
considered as liquidation. In order to classify funds that disappeared due
to an unknown reason (reason 4), we estimate the quarterly money ows of
the funds following the procedure mentioned in Agarwal, Daniel and Naik
(2003). We aggregated these money ows over the four quarters preceding
fund attrition. Using this information, funds with disappearance reason 4
(unknown) are classied as liquidated if the cumulative net money ows over
the nal year are negative, while otherwise it is considered as self-selected.
In Table 1 we report the number of funds that disappeared, the reason of
disappearance, and we report the average quarterly net money ow2, and
the average quarterly return over the year preceding disappearance
From Table 1 we observe that a total of 612 hedge funds disappear from
the data set during the period 1994-2000. Moreover, for the funds that liq-
uidated or closed down the average quarterly return in the year preceding
the disappearance is  1:7%; while for the funds that disappeared at the
fund managers request or are closed to new investors this average quarterly
return is 0:2% and 0:7%; respectively. A similar pattern is observed for
the average net money ow, which is negative for the funds that liquidated
( 3:7%) while it is strongly positive (9:4% and 15:8%) for the funds that
2Quarterly net money ows are dened as [NAVi;t   NAVi;t 1(1 + ri;t)]=NAVi;t 1;
where NAVi;t denotes the size of the fund (net asset value) at the end of quarter t and
ri;t is the return for fund i during quarter t:
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self-selected. Apparently, low past returns combined with a net money out-
ow increase the likelihood that a fund will liquidate. After classifying the
di¤erent disappearance reasons, we identify 360 funds that disappear from
the database due to liquidation, while 210 funds self-select themselves out
of the database.
In Table 2 we report the average quarterly returns and the average quar-
terly net money ows for funds that self-select, liquidate or survive during
the sample period 1994 - 2000. For example, the rst row indicates that, in
the rst quarter of 1994, the average return of funds that liquidated before
the end of our sample period is  2:61%, while it is  1:83% for funds that
survived until 2000. The table clearly shows that funds that liquidate dur-
ing the sample period have substantial lower average returns and net money
ows than funds that self-select or survive. The average return for funds
that liquidate is about 0:50% per quarter, while funds that self-select or sur-
vive have an average quarterly return of 2:04% and 3:59%; respectively. The
average quarterly net money ows exhibit a similar pattern. Funds that liq-
uidate have an average quarterly net money ow of only 2:49%, while funds
that self-select or survive have an average net money ow of 7:47% and
9:07%, respectively. Combining the three subsamples gives an average quar-
terly return and net money ow of 3:06% and 7:78% (not reported). Note
that the average returns of the surviving funds are about 2:1% (per annum)
higher than the average return of the combined samples. This number is
usually referred to as survivorship bias (see, e.g. Malkiel, 1995 and Liang,
2000). The liquidation bias is dened as the di¤erence between the average
returns of the combination of the subsamples of self-selected and surviving
funds and the combination of all three subsamples. This bias is about 2:2%
(per annum) (see, e.g. Baquero, Ter Horst and Verbeek, 2004). Finally,
we can dene self-selection bias as the di¤erence between the subsamples of
liquidated and surviving funds and the combination of all three subsamples.
This bias is about 1:2% (per annum).
Because our interest lies in persistence at horizons of at least one quarter,
we aggregate all information to quarterly levels. This has the advantage of
reducing the impact of return smoothing due to the possibility that a hedge
fund invests in securities that are not actively traded (see Getmansky, Lo
and Makarov, 2004). Consequently, we also analyze liquidation and self-
selection at the quarterly level. In the remainder of the paper liquidation
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Quarter self-selected liquidated survivors
return net ow return net ow return net ow
94-I  1:39% 6:47%  2:61% 8:59%  1:83% 6:33%
94-II 0:43% 1:57% 2:64% 10:12% 0:97% 8:71%
94-III 1:60% 8:85%  0:46% 3:55% 2:27% 8:54%
94-IV  1:63%  0:89%  1:06% 1:78%  0:73% 2:40%
95-I 3:31% 8:07% 2:40% 3:24% 4:47% 12:92%
95-II 3:59% 11:48% 0:90% 1:32% 5:11% 6:83%
95-III 3:56% 1:21% 0:48% 1:01% 4:71% 7:18%
95-IV 2:32% 3:28% 2:94% 2:26% 3:64% 1:60%
96-I 3:44% 7:81% 0:90%  0:66% 3:32% 8:39%
96-II 8:20% 9:48% 3:48% 12:50% 6:06% 11:40%
96-III 1:18%  1:01% 1:07% 0:47% 2:25% 14:04%
96-IV 4:47% 7:90% 3:69% 7:70% 6:68% 14:63%
97-I 4:45% 23:39% 4:27% 11:09% 4:32% 13:79%
97-II 4:59% 4:78% 2:60% 3:13% 5:35% 12:14%
97-III 5:40% 11:12% 5:94% 13:48% 7:83% 15:64%
97-IV  2:83%  6:56%  2:12%  2:30%  0:50% 5:75%
98-I 2:81% 9:73% 0:53% 3:63% 5:73% 19:48%
98-II  5:64% 16:47%  2:24% 0:80%  0:66% 9:76%
98-III  2:77% 6:68%  6:63% 0:25%  4:98% 2:63%
98-IV 0:64% 9:00%  0:33% 2:40% 5:85% 9:14%
99-I 1:13% 35:39%  2:25%  8:82% 3:70% 2:96%
99-II 4:19%  3:48% 1:45%  3:28% 8:45% 9:48%
99-III  3:38%  0:49%  1:14%  9:41% 0:69%  3:29%
99-IV 11:38% 9:01%  2:36%  3:06% 13:36% 17:20%
00-I         5:96% 0:81%
average (unweighted) 2:04% 7:47% 0:50% 2:49% 3:59% 9:07%
average (weighted) 2:15% 7:35% 1:03% 3:03% 4:14% 7:78%
Table 2: Average quarterly returns and net money ows of US hedge funds
in the TASS database that self-select, liquidate or survive during the sample
period 1994-2000. The row labeled average (weighted)reports the weighted
averages (weighted by the number of funds per quarter) over the sample pe-
riod, while the row average (unweighted)reports the unweighted averages.
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will be denoted by an indicator variable L, such that Lit = 0 if fund i
has liquidated in quarter t (Lit = 1 otherwise). Given that a fund is not
liquidated, returns may not be available due to self-selection, and we let
Sit = 0 if fund i attrited the database because of self-selection (Sit = 1
otherwise). This implies that a return rit is observed only if LitSit = 1:
For both decisions we specify a binary choice model. First, the liqui-
dation decision is modelled by means of a binary probit model, with latent
variable equation
Lit = 10 +
6X
j=1
1jri;t j + x
0
it1 + "1;it; (1)
where xit denotes a vector of fund characteristics that a¤ect liquidation. The
observed indicator satises Lit = 0 (liquidation) if Lit < 0 and 1 otherwise.
The specication allows fund returns up to six quarters ago to a¤ect the
liquidation decision. It is assumed that "1;it is IIN(0; 1); independent of the
explanatory variables. We expect that 1j > 0 for several of the lags, so
that the better performing funds are, ceteris paribus, less likely to liquidate.
Similarly, we specify a process for the self-selection decision as a probit
model based on
Sit = 20 +
6X
j=1
2jri;t j + x
0
it2 + "2;it; (2)
with Sit = 0 (self-selection) if Sit < 0 and 1 otherwise. While the set of
conditioning variables xit in both equations is in principle the same, a priori
exclusion restrictions may be imposed.
In Table 3 we present some summary statistics of the fund-specic vari-
ables (xit) that were included in the liquidation and self-selection models.
Most of these variable also appear in related specications of Brown, Goet-
zmann and Park (2001) and Baquero, Ter Horst and Verbeek (2004). Sum-
mary statistics are based on 20138 fund/period observations. It appears
that 59% of the observations are from o¤shore hedge funds. These funds,
while reporting in US$, are located in tax-havens like the Virgin Islands.
The average incentive fee of the fund manager is about 16%, but can be
as high as 50% of realized performance. Note that these incentive fees are
only obtained when the fund has recovered past losses (high water-mark).
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Variable mean std.dev min max
o¤shore 0:59 0:49 0 1
Incentive Fees 15:87 7:82 0 50
Mng. Fees 1:63 1:08 0 8
Underwater 0:14 0:34 0 1
ln(NAV) 16:73 1:79 7:58 23:30
ln(Age) 3:80 0:66 2:56 5:62
ln(Age)2 14:89 5:09 6:58 31:55
StDev 0:08 0:08 0:00 1:63
Table 3: Summary statistics fund-specic variables. (20138 fund/period
observations)
The annual management fee varies between 0% and 8% (of net asset value)
and has an average of 1:6%. The underwater indicator is equal to one if a
fund has a negative cumulative return over the past eight quarters3, which
occurs in 14% of the cases. The age of the funds varies between 13 months
and 275 months (about 23 years), while the average age is about 45 months.
The average size of the hedge funds, measured by their log net asset value
corresponds to about 18 million US$. Total risk is measured by the standard
deviation of the previous six quarterly returns (StDev).
Fund size (NAV) is not available for each quarter for all funds in our
sample. Therefore, we use the most recent observation of net asset value
available from the TASS database. However, there remain some observa-
tions for which NAV is missing and cannot be imputed. This occurs in
7% of the cases. Because we do not want to eliminate these observations,
we estimated the liquidation and self-selection model using two specica-
tions, one including size (based on 20138 fund/period observations) and
one excluding size (based on 21297 fund/period observations). In Table 4
we report the estimation results based on 20138 fund/period observations
for the probit specication for liquidation versus non-liquidation (including
size). Note that non-liquidation means that it is still possible that the fund
self-selected during the sample period. Therefore, we subsequently remove
all the fund/period observations where a fund liquidated (321 fund/period
observations) and estimate the probit specication to explain self-selection
versus survival (including size), where survival implies that the fund did not
3The cumulative return is determined over at least ve quarters with a maximum of
eight quarters.
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Parameters Estimate Std.error Parameters Estimate Std. Error
intercept 1:839 0:796 StDev 1:855 0:401
r1 1:049 0:227 ln(Age)  0:764 0:418
r2 0:687 0:235 ln(Age)2 0:111 0:055
r3 1:039 0:240 o¤shore  0:143 0:055
r4 0:192 0:249 Incentive Fees  0:009 0:003
r5 0:239 0:229 Mng. Fees  0:033 0:022
r6 0:406 0:247 underwater  0:278 0:069
ln(NAV) 0:156 0:015 time  0:028 0:004
Loglikelihood:  1417:524 Chi-squared test: 459.00 (DF = 15)
pseudoR2: 0.139 (p = 0:000)
Table 4: Estimation results liquidation model, including net asset value
(size) variable (20138 fund/period observations).
Parameters Estimate Std.error Parameters Estimate Std. Error
intercept 2:475 0:890 StDev 0:530 0:410
r1 1:195 0:240 ln(Age)  0:722 0:458
r2 0:668 0:250 ln(Age)2 0:097 0:060
r3 0:634 0:247 o¤shore  0:006 0:059
r4 0:140 0:264 Incentive Fees  0:010 0:004
r5  0:335 0:234 Mng. Fees 0:029 0:027
r6  0:028 0:263 underwater  0:024 0:088
ln(NAV) 0:113 0:016 time  0:024 0:005
Loglikelihood:  1100:890 Chi-squared test: 171.05 (DF = 15)
pseudoR2: 0.072 (p = 0:000)
Table 5: Estimation results self-selection model, including net asset value
(size) variable (19817 fund/period observations).
liquidate and still prefers to report their performance to the data vendor.
The estimation results are reported in Table 5. The estimation results for
both specications excluding size are reported in the appendix (Table 8 and
Table 9). All models include a linear time trend to take account of aggregate
shocks to the probabilities of liquidation and self-selection.
From an inspection of Tables 4 and 5, it appears that the impact of
historical returns is somewhat stronger for the liquidation decision than for
the self-selection decision. For both specications, only the rst three past
quarterly returns have a signicant impact on the self-selection decision.
In the liquidation model, positive coe¢ cients indicate that higher historical
returns imply a lower probability to liquidate. In the self-selection model,
they indicate that funds with high historical returns are more likely to sur-
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vive, where surviving means that the fund did not liquidate and decides to
keep reporting to the data vendor. However, in the liquidation model an
additional impact of historical returns is captured by the underwater indi-
cator, which is highly signicant. The negative coe¢ cient implies that if a
fund has a negative aggregate return over the most recent eight quarters,
it is signicantly more likely to liquidate. That is, if a fund is underwater,
implying that the manager will not receive the incentive fee, the probability
of liquidation increases substantially, potentially due to excessive risk-taking
(compare Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ross, 2003). For self-selection, the im-
pact of being underwater seems negligible, both economically and statisti-
cally. The impact of size (ln(NAV)) is signicantly positive, i.e. smaller
funds have a higher probability to liquidate or self-select than larger funds
(ceteris paribus).
The results for the self-selection model are clearly at odds with the idea
that good performing funds are more likely to stop reporting because they
no longer wish to attract new investors. Also, it does not appear to be
the case that large funds, which may su¤er most from decreasing returns
to scale of their investment strategies, are more likely to voluntary stop re-
porting because managers are unwilling to attract new money. Total risk,
as measured by the standard deviation over the past six quarters, does not
signicantly a¤ect the self-selection decision, while it signicantly a¤ects
the liquidation decision, implying that high risk hedge funds have a higher
probability to not-liquidate. This seems a counterintuitive result, and ap-
parently contradicts the ndings of Brown, Goetzmann and Park (2001)
who nd that high risk funds have a higher probability to liquidate. How-
ever, our results suggest that high risk funds experience a somewhat lower
liquidation probability, given the return history and fund size. It indicates
that high risk funds are allowed to have more extreme negative returns than
low risk funds before they decide to liquidate (see Baquero, Ter Horst and
Verbeek, 2004)
In both specications, age has signicant nonlinear impact, indicating
that old funds with past poor performance are less likely to disappear than
young funds with a similar poor performance. This nding corresponds to
the results of Boyson (2003a, 2003b) who performs unconditional and con-
ditional survival tests, and nds that age and manager ability are positively
related to the likelihood of a managers survival. O¤shore funds have a
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larger probability to liquidate than onshore funds, while given that the fund
did not liquidate, being an o¤shore fund does not signicantly a¤ect the self-
selection decision. The impact of the incentive fee on the non-liquidation
probability or survival probability is signicantly negative, i.e. a higher
incentive fee, ceteris paribus, increases the probability that a fund will liq-
uidate or self-select.
Although it is suggested in the literature that self-selection bias and sur-
vivorship or look-ahead bias will o¤set each other, our results show that most
of the factors in our specications a¤ect the liquidation and self-selection de-
cisions in the same direction. The magnitudes of the estimated coe¢ cients
in the self-selection model are typically smaller than those in the liquidation
model. The management fee has a di¤erent sign across the two models,
but is insignicant in both models. On the basis of the estimation results
of these two models, we conclude that self-selection is not exogenous, and
we expect that look-ahead biases due to self-selection and liquidation will
not o¤set, but even strengthen each other, and correcting for both biases
will be necessary. In the next section, we describe how both biases can be
disentangled and how persistence analysis can be corrected for these biases.
This can be achieved using an extension of the methodology reported in Ter
Horst, Nijman and Verbeek (2001).
3 Disentangling look-ahead bias and self-selection
bias
Suppose interest lies in analyzing fund performance over the period t+1 to
t+ s+1; conditional upon a given information set 
t: In some applications,
this information set may be empty. In others, 
t will contain indicators
for the funds investment style and its previous performance (e.g. its per-
formance decile during a ranking period). This means that interest lies in
the conditional distribution of returns ri;t+1; :::ri;t+s+1 given 
t; which we
denote by
f(ri;t+1; :::; ri;t+s+1j
t); (3)
where f is generic notation for a (conditional) density function. Empirically,
we can only obtain full information about this joint distribution if the fund
has not liquidated or self-selected during the period t + 1 to t + s + 1: Let
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us denote this by Yit = 1: This means we can empirically identify
f(ri;t+1; :::; ri;t+s+1j
t; Yit = 1): (4)
If (3) and (4) are identical, liquidation and self-selection is exogenous and
no biases arise if the sample selection process is ignored. However, as we
have seen in the previous sections, it is likely that both liquidation and self-
selection are determined by historical performance and other characteristics
that may have a relation with returns during period t+ 1 to t+ s+ 1: For
example, funds that have high levels of (idiosyncratic) risk are more likely
to have extreme returns and are typically less likely to survive (see Brown et
al., 1992, or Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser, 1997). The di¤erence between
(3) and (4) drives the look-ahead bias in performance measures.
A rst step in solving this identication problem is obtained by writing
(compare Ter Horst, Nijman and Verbeek, 2001)
f(ri;t+1; :::ri;t+s+1; zitj
t) = witf(ri;t+1; :::ri;t+s+1; zitj
t; Yit = 1); (5)
where
wit =
PfYit = 1j
tg
PfYit = 1jri;t+1; :::ri;t+s+1;
t; zitg : (6)
is a weight factor. In this expression, zit denotes a vector of observable fund
characteristics and other variables that are relevant for fund liquidation and
self-selection from t + 1 to t + s + 1: The weight factor wit indicates how
the distribution, conditional upon Yit = 1 can be adjusted to recover the
distribution of returns unconditional upon Yit = 1; which is what we are
really interested in. If we are willing to assume that the denominator of (6)
does not depend upon ri;t+1; :::; ri;t+s+1 directly, but only through the history
of returns and other fund characteristics (contained in zit); the weights can
be identied and estimated empirically.
This approach to correct for sample selection bias is di¤erent from the
econometric approaches to these problems based upon the work of Heck-
man (1979) and Hausman and Wise (1979), because the latter approaches
assume that the model of interest is conditional upon the same set of vari-
ables as the selection processes. In our case, this is inappropriate. Instead,
we assume that the set of (observable) explanatory variables zit can be cho-
sen such that, conditional upon zit; selection is independent of current and
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future, potentially unobserved, returns. This approach is referred to as se-
lection upon observables" and is employed in, e.g., Fitzgerald, Gottschalk
and Mo¢ tt (1998) to correct for attrition bias from the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics.
In the current application, Yit = 1 implies that the fund has not liq-
uidated during t + 1 to t + s + 1 and has not stopped reporting due to
self-selection. Let us refer to these two conditions as Y1;it = 1 and Y2;it = 1;
respectively, so that Yit = Y1;itY2;it: Referring to the two binary choice mod-
els specied above, it holds that
Y1;it =
t+s+1Q
=t+1
Li
and
Y2;it =
t+s+1Q
=t+1
Si :
Then Y1i = 0 says that fund i is not used in the analysis because of fund
liquidation, while Y2i = 0 says that it is not used because of self-selection.
To disentangle the impact of these two processes, rst note that we can write
wit =
PfY2;it = 1j
t; Y1;it = 1g
PfY2;it = 1jri;t+1; :::ri;t+s+1; zit;
t; Y1;it = 1g
 PfY1;it = 1j
tg
PfY1;it = 1jri;t+1; :::ri;t+s+1; zit;
tg (7)
= w2;itw1;it:
If w2;it = 1 for all i; t; then self-selection is exogenous and does not lead
to look-ahead bias in measures for performance (persistence). In this case,
liquidation implies look-ahead bias if w1;it 6= 1 and this is the case analyzed
by Baquero, Ter Horst and Verbeek (2004). In this paper, we disentangle
the two sources of bias by identifying both sets of weights and applying
corrections with one weight or their product. The correction for self-selection
is conditional upon the fund not liquidating. The application of the above
correction weights allows us to determine to what extent we get di¤erent
results if we only correct for selection bias due to liquidation, assuming
self-selection is random.
To identify the weights we need to assume that the probabilities do not
depend upon future, potentially unobserved returns. Further, we assume
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that self-selection and fund liquidation are mutually exclusive events, and
both describe absorbing states. That is, once a fund stops reporting to
TASS, it will not return in the database at a later stage. Then the denomi-
nator of w1;it can be determined from the binary choice model as
PfY1;it = 1jri;t+1; :::ri;t+s+1; zit;
tg = (8)
PfLi;t+1 = 1jrit; ri;t 1; :::; xi;t+1g:::PfLi;t+s+1 = 1jri;t+s; ri;t+s 1; :::; xi;t+s+1g
and similarly for w2;it: The right hand side probabilities are described by
the probit model in (4) provided the appropriate functional form (and con-
ditioning variables) are chosen in xit. Consequently, consistent estimation
of the binary choice models for liquidation and self-selection allows us to
obtain consistent estimators for the two sets of weights, which enables us
to correct for look-ahead bias due to these two processes and separate their
e¤ects upon performance measures and their persistence. To estimate the
numerator in (7) when 
t takes on a limited number of di¤erent values (e.g.
past performance decile), it is most convenient to use a simple nonparametric
approach (see below).
4 Persistence in Hedge Fund Performance
Empirical studies on the behavior of investors in hedge funds have shown
that money-ows chase past performance (see, e.g., Agarwal, Daniel and
Naik, 2003, or Baquero and Verbeek, 2004). Moreover, several recent stud-
ies document some evidence of persistence in hedge fund performance at
quarterly horizons (see, e.g., Agarwal and Naik, 2000, Bares, Gibson and
Gyger, 2002), while at longer horizons the results are more ambiguous (see,
e.g., Brown, Goetzmann and Ibbotson, 1999, Brown and Goetzmann, 2003).
Apparently, if investors take into account that persistence is mainly a short
term phenomenon, looking at past performance provides potentially valu-
able information for investing in hedge funds. However, while all the above
mentioned studies on performance persistence of hedge funds control for the
e¤ects of survivorship bias, none of them corrects for look-ahead bias due to
fund liquidation or self-selection. Baquero, Ter Horst and Verbeek (2004)
correct for look-ahead bias due to liquidation and nd positive persistence
at horizons of one and four quarters, although the statistical signicance is
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weak. In the previous section we extended the methodology of the latter pa-
per to allow us to disentangle the e¤ects of look-ahead bias and self-selection
bias. In this section we will apply this method on analyzing performance
persistence of hedge funds, and examine whether it is indeed the case that
self-selection bias and survivorship e¤ects o¤set each other, as claimed by
Ackermann, McEnally and Ravenscraft (1999).
First, we will examine performance persistence in raw returns by exam-
ining whether winning funds over the last two or four quarters are more
likely to be top performers in the next two to four quarters. We follow a
similar procedure as Baquero, Ter Horst and Verbeek (2004), by distinguish-
ing a ranking period of two or four quarters and an evaluation period of two
or four quarters. The ranking based on past performance is broken down
into ten deciles (decile 10 contains the past winners), and in the subsequent
evaluation period we calculate the average returns of each of these deciles.
The procedure is repeated over the entire sample period, moving forward
by one quarter at the time and adjusting the sample by including the funds
that have a su¢ ciently long return history. Fund-of-funds are excluded to
avoid double counting. To avoid backlling bias, returns are only used in
this exercise if the fund has a history of at least four quarters.
First of all, in order to prevent spurious performance persistence patterns
that are due to look-ahead bias (see, e.g. Carpenter and Lynch, 1999),
we apply the correction method as introduced by Ter Horst, Nijman and
Verbeek (2001). Basically, we repeat the analysis of Baquero, Ter Horst and
Verbeek (2004) by multiplying the performance measure (e.g. average return
over the ranking period) with a weight factor w1;it which is the ratio of an
unconditional non-liquidation probability and a conditional non-liquidation
probability. This conditional probability can be obtained from our estimated
liquidation process reported in Section 3, while the unconditional probability
is equal to the ratio of funds that were not liquidated during the ranking
period and the number of funds present at the beginning of the ranking
period. In a similar way we correct the average returns over the evaluation
period, where the unconditional probabilities are conditional upon the funds
decile during the ranking period.
Second, we correct for self-selection bias by multiplying the performance
measure with a second weight factor w2;it. This factor is the ratio of the
conditional probability of non-self-selection (conditional upon not being liq-
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Figure 1: Bi-quarterly persistence in raw returns.
uidated), and an unconditional non-self-selection probability (conditional
upon not being liquidated). This conditional probability can be obtained
from the estimated self-selection process of Section 3. The unconditional
probability is now equal to the ratio of funds that were not self-selected mi-
nus the ones that were liquidated during the ranking period, and the number
of funds present at the beginning of the ranking period minus the ones that
were liquidated during the ranking period. Similarly, we correct the average
returns over the evaluation period once more, but adjusting for the fact that
the unconditional probabilities are now conditional upon the funds decile
during the ranking period.
The results of the above exercises are provided in Tables 6 and 7 for
the two-quarter and four-quarter horizon, respectively, and summarized in
Figures 1 and 2. We report the empirical persistence of raw returns at bi-
quarterly and annual horizons, without any correction (raw returns), with a
correction for look-ahead bias due to liquidation (corrected returns) and with
a correction for look-ahead bias due to both liquidation and self-selection
(double corrected returns). All estimates are based on the full sample of
hedge funds, excluding fund-of-funds.
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Table 6: Persistence Estimates (Raw returns)
Average performance (raw returns)
Two-Quarters
(1) (2) (3) (1) - (3)
Decile non corrected corrected double corrected
1 (losers) 0.1284 0.1206 0.1122 0.0162
(0.0794) (0.0865) (0.0953) (0.0200)
2 0.1278 0.1248 0.1258 0.0020
(0.0335) (0.0367) (0.0379) (0.0068)
3 0.1308 0.1336 0.1356 -0.0048
(0.0291) (0.0297) (0.0302) (0.0038)
4 0.1302 0.1320 0.1338 -0.0036
(0.0242) (0.0244) (0.0247) (0.0028)
5 0.1230 0.1262 0.1306 -0.0076
(0.0218) (0.0239) (0.0257) (0.0062)
6 0.1492 0.1510 0.1536 -0.0044
(0.0255) (0.0262) (0.0260) (0.0055)
7 0.1602 0.1662 0.1652 -0.0050
(0.0296) (0.0289) (0.0291) (0.0069)
8 0.1848 0.1876 0.1906 -0.0058
(0.0416) (0.0439) (0.0448) (0.0076)
9 0.2112 0.2070 0.2094 0.0018
(0.0529) (0.0494) (0.0525) (0.0055)
10 (winners) 0.2448 0.2280 0.2270 0.0178
(0.0810) (0.0806) (0.0785) (0.0115)
winners - losers 0.1164 0.1072 0.1148 0.0016
(0.0918) (0.0939) (0.0997) (0.0232)
Each quarter, funds are sorted into ten rank portfolios based on their previous
two-quarters. Next, average returns over the next two quarters are computed, for
each decile. Using returns from 1994-2000, this produces a time-series for each
decile of 21 average two-quarter returns. The numbers in the table are the annu-
alized time-series averages and their standard errors in parentheses. The standard
errors are corrected for autocorrelation based on the Newey-West approach. The
corrected gures employ a weighting procedure to eliminate liquidation bias, and
the double corrected employ a weighting procedure to eliminate liquidation and
self-selection bias.
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Table 7: Persistence Estimates (Raw returns)
Average performance (raw returns)
Four-Quarters
(1) (2) (3) (1) - (3)
Decile non corrected corrected double corrected
1 (losers) 0.1601 0.1108 0.0838 0.0763
(0.0911) (0.0924) (0.0956) (0.0203)
2 0.1658 0.1503 0.1367 0.0291
(0.0600) (0.0566) (0.0537) (0.0144)
3 0.1459 0.1297 0.1211 0.0248
(0.0455) (0.0415) (0.0400) (0.0013)
4 0.1451 0.1369 0.1320 0.0130
(0.0387) (0.0378) (0.0356) (0.0073)
5 0.1418 0.1383 0.1338 0.0080
(0.0252) (0.0244) (0.0257) (0.0550)
6 0.1342 0.1314 0.1273 0.0069
(0.0318) (0.0333) (0.0356) (0.0072)
7 0.1403 0.1369 0.1328 0.0075
(0.0381) (0.0393) (0.0390) (0.0087)
8 0.1565 0.1536 0.1573 -0.0008
(0.0325) (0.0317) (0.0333) (0.0071)
9 0.1900 0.1853 0.1823 0.0076
(0.0468) (0.0505) (0.0485) (0.0094)
10 (winners) 0.2029 0.1888 0.1825 0.0204
(0.1016) (0.0971) (0.0975) (0.0147)
winners - losers 0.0428 0.0781 0.0987 -0.0559
(0.0693) (0.0718) (0.0745) (0.0207)
Each quarter, funds are sorted into ten rank portfolios based on their previous
four-quarter returns, respectively. Next, average returns over the next four quar-
ters are computed, for each decile. Using returns from 1994-2000, this produces a
time-series for each decile of 17 (overlapping) average four-quarter returns. The
numbers in the table are the annualized time-series averages and their standard
errors in parentheses. The standard errors are corrected for autocorrelation based
on the Newey-West approach. The corrected gures employ a weighting proce-
dure to eliminate liquidation bias, and the double corrected employ a weighting
procedure to eliminate liquidation and self-selection bias.
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Figure 2: Four-quarterly persistence in raw returns.
The results are remarkable. First of all at a bi-quarterly as well as an
annual horizon we observe evidence of a persistence pattern which is without
corrections (raw returns) slightly J-shaped. As discussed in Hendricks, Pa-
tel and Zeckhauser (1997) and Ter Horst, Nijman and Verbeek (2001) such a
pattern could be explained by look-ahead bias. If we correct for look-ahead
bias the J-shape attens, and we nd positive persistence in performance.
The expected return on a zero investment portfolio that is long in winners
(decile 10) and short in losers (decile 1), is approximately 9:9% at the annual
horizon and 11:5% and the bi-quarterly horizon. The persistence pattern is
much stronger for the bi-quarterly horizon, and this corresponds to the nd-
ings of Brown, Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1999), Agarwal and Naik (2000),
and Bares, Gibson and Gyger (2002), who also nd evidence of a persistence
pattern at a short term horizon, while the pattern is less stronger at longer
horizons. However, note that these studies do not correct for look-ahead
bias, and that without corrections, average returns may be overestimated
by as much as 4:9% (decile 1, annual horizon). For additional discussion on
correcting for look-ahead bias we refer to Baquero, Ter Horst and Verbeek
(2004).
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The most striking result is that when we also correct for self-selection
bias the positive persistence pattern is further strengthened. The persis-
tence pattern at an annual horizon is even much stronger than before. This
contradicts the claim of Ackermann, McEnally and Ravenscraft (1999), and
shows that self-selection bias does not o¤set liquidation bias. For most of
the deciles we see that liquidation bias and self-selection bias have the same
sign. For decile 1 at an annual horizon it even has an impact of an addi-
tional 2:7%, which implies that average returns may be overestimated by
as much as 7:6% if no correction for look-ahead bias due to liquidation and
self-selection is employed. At a bi-quarterly level, the impact of self-selection
bias is somewhat less, but for decile 1 until decile 4 the impact is statistically
signicant at an annual level.
5 Concluding remarks
When analyzing hedge fund performance and its persistence, a multi-period
sampling bias or look-ahead bias may arise if funds attrite from the available
databases due to reasons that relate to their performance. In this paper, we
consider two important reasons why funds may disappear from hedge fund
databases. First, funds may liquidate or close down due to their poor perfor-
mance, and, second, hedge fund managers may voluntary stop reporting to a
database vendor (self-selection). In this paper we empirically investigate the
determinants of fund liquidation and self-selection, and analyze the impact
of these two process upon persistence measures of hedge fund performance.
Using information from the TASS database, covering the period 1994-
2000, we nd that both liquidation and self-selection are more likely for
hedge funds that have a poor return history. While the relationship is some-
what stronger for the liquidation process, this implies that look-ahead bias
due to self-selection a¤ects persistence measures in the same direction as
does look-ahead bias due to fund liquidation. Consequently, double correct-
ing persistence tables leads to a stronger persistence pattern than obtained
in Baquero, Ter Horst and Verbeek (2004), where look-ahead bias due to liq-
uidation is the focus of interest. At the annual horizon, the expected excess
return on a winner minus loser portfolio, based upon previous year returns,
is close to 10% when both biases are taken into account, while it is only 4%
if no correction is employed. These biases are almost entirely located in the
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bottom decile, where expected returns may be overestimated by almost 8%
per year. The di¤erence is statistically signicant. These results are in con-
ict with the suggestion in Ackermann, McEnally and Ravenscraft (1999)
that positive and negative survival-related biases may cancel out.
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Appendix
Parameters Estimate Std.error Parameters Estimate Std. Error
intercept 3:729 0:750 StDev 1:247 0:381
r1 1:035 0:211 ln(Age)  0:413 0:398
r2 0:892 0:225 ln(Age)2 0:072 0:053
r3 1:236 0:231 o¤shore  0:086 0:052
r4 0:464 0:240 Incentive Fees  0:011 0:003
r5 0:358 0:218 Mng. Fees  0:085 0:020
r6 0:061 0:169 underwater  0:392 0:067
time  0:026 0:004
Loglikelihood:-1509.352 Chi-squared test: 344.93 ( DF = 14)
pseudoR2: 0.103 (p = 0:000)
Table 8: Estimation results liquidation model, excluding net asset value
(size) variable (21297 fund/period observations).
Parameters Estimate Std.error Parameters Estimate Std. Error
intercept 3:869 0:839 StDev 0:040 0:375
r1 1:371 0:234 ln(Age)  0:500 0:443
r2 0:748 0:241 ln(Age)2 0:076 0:058
r3 0:770 0:240 o¤shore 0:042 0:057
r4 0:216 0:237 Incentive Fees  0:011 0:004
r5  0:028 0:184 Mng. Fees  0:019 0:025
r6 0:278 0:266 underwater  0:078 0:085
time  0:023 0:004
Loglikelihood: -1153.794 Chi-squared test: 135.32 (DF = 14)
pseudoR2: 0.055 (p = 0:000)
Table 9: Estimation results self-selection model, excluding net asset value
(size) variable (20972 fund/period observations).
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